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PANEL 4: 
TRANSLATIONAL 
EXPECTATIONS AND ISSUES: 
MAKING IT WORK IN PRACTICE 
 
AMANDA PUSTILNIK, DAVID SEMINOWICZ, AND M. KAYLIE GIOIOSO 
 
SPEAKERS: DR. MARTHA FARAH, PHD,* JUDGE NANCY GERTNER,** AND 
STACEY TOVINO*** 
 
I.      INTRODUCTION 
 
The final panel of the conference focused on translational expectations 
and issues, and turned to questions relating to whether and how the 
neuroimaging of pain may be useful in legal settings. The panel represented 
a range of expertise, including a neuroscientist who works on translational 
issues in law and science, a former federal judge, and a professor of law 
whose scholarship emphasizes the history of medicine.1 Dr. Martha J. 
Farah, PhD spoke first, focusing on the dual promise and challenge of using 
neuroimaging as medical and legal evidence of pain.2 She described the 
 
Copyright © 2015 by Amanda Pustilnik. 
* Director of the Center for Neuroscience & Society. 
** U.S. District Judge, District of Massachusetts (ret.); Adjunct Professor of Law & 
Neuroscience, Harvard Law School; Faculty member, Center for Law, Brain & Behavior (MGH). 
See Judge Nancy Gertner, Faculty, CTR. L., BRAIN & BEHAV., 
http://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/faculty/nancy-gertner/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
*** Professor of Law, University of Nevada. See Stacey A. Tovino, Faculty, UNLV WILLIAM S. 
BOYD SCH. LAW, http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/stacey-tovino.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2015). 
 1. Dr. Martha Farah, PhD, Judge Nancy Gertner, & Prof. Stacey Tovino, Imaging the Brain, 
Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 4: Translational 
Expectations and Issues: Making it Work in Practice (Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter Panel 4] 
(transcript on file with the editors).  
 2. Id. at 1; see also id. at 1–3 (explaining that neuroimaging will not be adequate evidence of 
pain until there is a standard way of describing the subjective psychological nature of pain); see 
also, e.g., Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 433, 433–34 (2007) [hereinafter Pain Detection] (noting that researchers have been able 
to use neuroimaging to identify precise brain regions that enable individuals to experience pain 
and the amount of pain a person is experiencing); Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the 
Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 599 (2011) [hereinafter The Experiential Future] (acknowledging that 
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ways in which neuroimaging technologies (functional MRIs (“fMRI”) in 
particular) are already useful in the field of psychiatry, changing basic 
research, challenging long standing disease definitions and descriptions, 
and suggesting new avenues for treatment.3 She analogized between the 
utility of fMRIs in psychiatric illnesses and chronic pain disorders because 
both involve the search for the physiology of disorders that are otherwise 
phenomenological and subjective.4 She expressed the hope that 
neuroimaging may produce a diagnostic marker for different kinds of 
chronic pain conditions, but cautioned that more research may show that 
pain is more various and complex than we currently imagine.5 Indeed, we 
may not find a biomarker or neural signature for many different kinds of 
pain experience.6 She expressed great optimism that fMRIs and other 
neuroimaging techniques may produce legally relevant results.7 While 
acknowledging the group-to-individual inference problem and the reverse 
inference problem (discussed below),8 she suggested that these are 
 
although neuroimaging is being used in pretrial litigation, there are still numerous obstacles to 
overcome before neuroimaging can be used in clinics or courtrooms). 
 3. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see generally Paul M. Matthews et al., Applications of fMRI in 
Translational Medicine and Clinical Practice, 7 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 732, 735–37, 
741 (2006) (reviewing the many applications of fMRI, including its use in selecting optimal 
treatment for patients with psychiatric diseases, establishing brain patterns associated with 
schizophrenia, and gaining better understanding of genetic factors). 
 4. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1–2; see also Oguz Demirci & Vince D Calhoun, Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging – Implications for Detection of Schizophrenia, 4 EUROPEAN 
NEUROLOGICAL REVIEW [EUR. NEUR. REV.], no 2, 2009, at 103, 103 (U.K.) (explaining that due 
to the subjective nature of schizophrenia, there is no objective method of diagnosing it, but using 
fMRI may be valuable in investigating the physiological disturbances that lead to the 
manifestation of the disease); Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 434, 441–42 (explaining that pain 
has many phenomenological components and it is hard to properly evaluate an individual’s level 
of pain). 
 5. See Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2–3 (describing the need for an accurate method of 
describing chronic pain in order to be able to rely on neuroimaging as evidence of pain because, 
for example, chronic pain of someone with phantom limb might be different from the chronic pain 
of a bad back); see also The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 597 (explaining that the new 
technologies available will improve methods of assessing pain in the future, but these new 
technologies may never be able to make intersubjective assessments of pain). 
 6. See Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining that the ability to accurately map the different 
types of pain onto information from brain imaging will not be possible until there is a method of 
assessing the subjective nature of pain); see also The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 589 
(explaining that even though scientists have made tremendous progress in assessing pain with 
more precision, the technology may never be perfect). 
 7. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3; see also The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 610 
(explaining that accurate assessment of pain using the fMRI may help juries properly assess pain 
awards). 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 84–88 (discussing Dr. Farah’s view on the reverse 
inference problem); see generally, Russell A. Poldrack, Inferring Mental States From 
Neuroimaging Data: From Reverse Inference to Large-Scale Decoding, 72 NEURON, 692, 692 
(2011) (describing the many critiques of reverse inference in analyzing mental processes). 
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problems of experimental design, not principle problems that would prevent 
the development of a medically and legally useful tool.9 
The Honorable Nancy Gertner (ret.) emphasized the challenges of 
using pain neuroimaging in the legal system.10 She lauded Professor 
Farah’s optimism and agreed that neuroimaging protocols relating to 
chronic pain may achieve sufficient accuracy and reliability to pass the 
standards of admissibility in court.11 However, she sounded several 
important notes of caution. First, she emphasized a basic non-
commensurability between scientific measurements of pain and the legal 
category of “pain and suffering.”12 “Suffering,” she noted, is a normative 
concept.13 It relates to value judgments about how a claimant experienced 
his or her injury or disability, and how much legal decision makers believe 
he or she should be compensated for that distress.14 She suggested, 
accordingly, that even a “100 percent” perfect pain-o-meter could not fully 
substitute for the kinds of judgments that the law asks judges and juries to 
make.”15 She further emphasized several institutional considerations that 
should lead to caution relative to the use of neuroimaging.16 She discussed 
the variability in judges’ decisions regarding the admissibility of expert and 
scientific evidence, the appellate courts’ limited review of trial courts’ 
 
 9. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see generally Poldrack, supra note 8, at 692, 694, 696 
(acknowledging some of the limitations of reverse inference, but explaining the frameworks for 
getting around some of the experimental limitations). 
 10. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a 
Neuroscience Model of Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 
13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 235, 303–04 (2012) (describing the incompatibility between 
science’s focus on methodology and law’s focus on normative judgments, and how this makes it 
difficult to translate scientific knowledge to legal certainty in the courtroom). 
 11. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see Shaun Cassin, Comment, Eggshell Minds and Invisible 
Injuries: Can Neuroscience Challenge Longstanding Treatment of Tort Injuries?, 50 HOUS. L. 
REV. 929, 949 (2013) (citing an example of how a New York state court allowing a PET scan as 
evidence of brain trauma may, by extension, mean that other uses of neurosciences will pass the 
general acceptance standard applied to evidence in the courtroom). 
 12. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 441 (explaining that 
the phrase “pain and suffering” is broadly construed in the legal context as to permit recovery for 
not only physical pain, but for fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, 
humiliation, and indignity). Cf. Cassin, supra note 11, at 960 (explaining neuroscience’s inability 
to predict psychological states such as emotional distress). 
 13. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 441, 446 (explaining 
that the issue of attaching monetary value to the quality and quantity of pain that a plaintiff has 
experienced is a normative one). 
 14. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 446 (explaining that 
the process of pain valuation involves attaching an appropriate monetary value to the quality and 
quantity of pain suffered by the plaintiff). 
 15. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 446 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts on how difficult it is to value pain and suffering in the court). 
 16. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6–7, 14–15. 
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evidentiary determinations, the distorting role played by differences in 
parties’ resources, and the possible “Christmas tree effect”—the effect of 
being dazzled by lights and colors—that neuroimaging might have on 
jurors.17 She expressed the hope that judges, neuroscientists, and legal 
scholars can work together to produce clear standards that can be applied in 
every courtroom to uniformly guide judges and juries.18 She concluded on 
the optimistic note that if pain neuroimaging develops further and if 
uniform admissibility standards are generated, the law may no longer view 
claimants who have subjective complaints (like emotional pain and 
invisible but chronic physical pain conditions) with skepticism.19 
Professor Stacey Tovino, a legal scholar and historian of medicine, 
offered both constructive and critical remarks about the ways in which legal 
institutions use and respond to medical evidence.20 She described several 
concrete cases for pain neuroimaging in law, discussing health insurance 
reimbursement law, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Social 
Security Law.21 Turning to her more cautionary remarks, she briefly 
described the history of visualization technologies in the courtroom, and 
discussed historical and contemporary norms relating to the verification and 
treatment of pain.22 In particular, she informed the conference about the 
history of underestimating the pain of underprivileged classes of people and 
the ways that that this history continues to influence medical treatment and 
legal decisions today.23 
 
 17. Id.; see also Jennifer Kulynych, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech 
Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1261 (explaining that state courts rely on the Frye test to 
evaluate admissibility of scientific evidence while federal courts rely on a more comprehensive 
validity analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993)); Cassin, supra note 11, at 944, 951 (commenting on how cost can be a 
general deterrent to the use of neuroimaging in tort cases, and noting the “seductive allure” that 
neuroscience has on the jury). 
 18. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8; see also Eggen & Laury, supra note 10, at 284–85 (providing 
a model that can guide judges and attorneys when confronted with functional neuroimaging 
evidence in tort cases). 
 19. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 16; see also Eggen & Laury, supra note 10, at 284, 289 
(suggesting that the model proposed by the author can help substantiate claims of emotional 
distress). 
 20. See Panel 4, supra note 1, at 11–12 (giving examples of how hospitals and hospices could 
avoid being liable for neglecting to provide effective pain management control if the patient or 
their family could not provide evidence of pain). 
 21. Id. at 10–12. 
 22. See id. at 9–10, 14 (giving examples of the use of x-rays to show pain in the courtroom 
and how historically, pain has been treated differently in minority populations or less privileged 
individuals). 
 23. Id. at 9; see Dania Palanker, Note, Enslaved By Pain: How the U.S. Public Health System 
Adds to Disparities in Pain Treatment for African Americans, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
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II.      REMARKS OF PROFESSOR FARAH: HOW TO CREATE LEGALLY 
USEFUL TOOLS WITH FMRI 
 
Professor Farah opened the panel by describing the ways in which 
fMRI of the brain has already been useful in understanding subjective, 
emotional states other than pain.24 She described the ways in which 
neuroimaging (fMRIs in particular) “has already proven useful in 
psychiatry for research in revealing the pathophysiology of different 
symptoms and disorders . . . .”25 Further, neuroimaging has proven useful 
“in identifying [endophenotypes] . . . , for [different psychiatric illnesses], 
for genetic research, [and] for drug development.”26  
Neuroimaging allows researchers who study psychiatric illnesses to 
proceed in more systematic ways than in the past, Professor Farah 
explained.27 Previous research generally has been limited to testing 
“whether a certain molecule actually cures somebody or prevents somebody 
at high risks for schizophrenia from getting it.”28 Instead, using a fMRI, 
researchers can identify patterns in the brains of people with psychiatric 
illness, how these patterns differ from those in the brains of healthy control 
subjects, and then determine whether a particular drug “shifts that pattern 
[or] diminishes activation in the areas of concern.”29 For example, in the 
 
POL'Y 847, 858 (2008) (discussing the interrelationship between race and socioeconomic status, 
and the disparities in pain treatment). 
 24. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see generally Matthews et al., supra note 3, at 732, 735–37 
(explaining the application of the fMRI to the treatment of emotional disorders, such as depression 
and schizophrenia). 
 25. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Matthews et al., supra note 3, at 732, 736–37 
(explaining how neuroimaging has been helpful in translational medicine and clinical practice in 
understanding complex diseases). 
 26. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Matthews et al., supra note 3, at 732, 736–37 
(explaining that the fMRI has been used for the characterization of certain neurophysiologically 
based phenotypes that are associated with genetic disorders and for selecting optimal treatment for 
patients with psychiatric diseases). 
 27. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Abhisek C. Khandai & Howard J. Aizenstein, Recent 
Advances in Neuroimaging Biomarkers in Geriatric Psychiatry 2, 4 (June 1, 2014) (previously 
published in 15 CURR PSYCHIATRY REP. 360 (2013)) (on file with NIH), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3667151/pdf/nihms-474933.pdf.  
 28. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also S Miyamoto et al., Treatments for Schizophrenia: A 
Critical Review of Pharmacology and Mechanisms of Action of Antipsychotic drugs, 10 
MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 79, 79–85 (2005) (providing a review of the evolution of the treatment 
of schizophrenia in the context of antipsychotic drug development). 
 29. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Lisa J. Burklund & Matthew D. Lieberman, Advances 
in Functional Neuroimaging of Psychopathology, 18 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 333, 334 
(2011) (noting that the fMRI can elucidate neural regions and processes that may have abnormal 
functions in certain patients compared to healthy persons, providing useful information to 
optimize treatment). 
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case of depression, neuroimaging has allowed researchers to see that people 
suffering from depression show higher levels of activity in particular 
regions of the amygdala than do non-depressed people;30 neuroimaging 
permits researchers to test which drugs reduce excess amygdalar activity.31 
These “research uses [of neuroimaging] matter” already have “been 
valuable.”32 In the clinical setting, neuroimaging could be useful in the 
future for “diagnosis, maybe treatment response prediction, [and] 
prognosis;”33 however, its utility is less clear.34 Using neuroimaging for 
these purposes currently is “not the standard of care.”35 
Debates about the uses of neuroimaging in the psychiatric research 
community could be useful in understanding the role of neuroimaging for 
the diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment of chronic pain, Professor Farah 
opined.36 The appropriate uses of neuroimaging became a major issue in 
drafting the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM”).37 Published by the American Psychiatric Association, 
the DSM embodies a consensus of the psychiatric community (or at least of 
the drafting committee that authors the DSM) discussing the recognized 
 
 30. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also J. Paul Hamilton et al., Functional Neuroimaging of 
Major Depressive Disorder: A Meta-Analysis and New Integration of Baseline Activation and 
Neural Response Data, 169 AM J PSYCHIATRY 693, 693 (2012) (stating that neural response 
studies using negative stimuli showed greater amygdalar response in patients with major 
depressive disorders compared to healthy individuals). 
 31. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Callie L. McGrath et al., Toward a Neuroimaging 
Treatment Selection Biomarker for Major Depressive Disorder, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 821, 824–
25 (2013), available at http://archpsyc.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1696349 (showing 
that the left amygdala is one of the brain regions that demonstrates significant treatment outcome 
interaction using escitalopram and cognitive behavior therapy).  
 32. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; supra text accompanying notes 29–31. 
 33. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Glenda M. MacQueen, Will There Be a Role for 
Neuroimaging in Clinical Psychiatry?, 35 J. PSYCHIATRY NEUROSCIENCE 291, 291 (2010) (stating 
that neuroimaging methods are being used not only for accurate diagnosis of psychiatric 
symptoms, but also for monitoring treatment responses and clinical outcomes). 
 34. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also MacQueen, supra note 33, at 292 (discussing the need 
to investigate the feasibility and barriers of incorporating neuroimaging modalities in routine 
clinical practice). 
 35. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also MICHAEL FIRST ET AL., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE APA WORK GROUP ON NEUROIMAGING MARKERS OF PSYCHIATRIC 
DISORDERS 5–6 (2012) (explaining that peer reviewed scientific literature does not yet provide 
studies that support the use of a diagnostic imaging biomarker with high reliability or 
neuroimaging measures with high sensitivity or specificity in detecting psychiatric disorders). 
 36. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1. 
 37. Id.; see generally AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS [hereinafter DSM] (5th ed. 2013); see also Seth J. Gillihan & 
Eric Parens, Should We Expect “Neural Signatures” for DSM Diagnoses?, 72 J. CLINICAL 
PSYCHIATRY 1383, 1388 (2011) (concluding that neuroimaging modalities are less accurate and 
more expensive than behavioral methods in diagnosing psychiatric disorders, and are thus unlikely 
to become a useful tool for DSM based diagnoses). 
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psychiatric illnesses and their diagnostic criteria.38 The DSM has long been 
criticized as failing to define psychiatric illnesses in ways that map onto 
specific and unique pathophysiology—that is, psychiatric and emotional 
disorders that have physiological correlates and causes.39 Yet, it remains 
unclear whether the same pathophysiology underlies all cases of what the 
DSM would identify as the same disorder, nor is it clear whether the same 
pathophysiology may give rise to sufficiently different presentations across 
patients, and whether the patients would receive different diagnoses.40  
Accordingly, the National Institute of Mental Health (“NIMH”) is 
directing its funding of psychiatric research toward studies that use 
neuroimaging to identify whether there are unique neurological correlates 
of different psychiatric diagnoses, and to attempt to identify the ways in 
which the brains of people with distressing psychiatric symptoms function 
differently than the brains of matched controls.41 This direction on the part 
of NIMH led to conflict with the drafters of the DSM because “NIMH 
thinks it’s all a bad way of classifying patients and so we’re only going to 
fund people who use [neuroimaging]. It is quite a mess.”42  
This “mess,” Professor Farah discussed, “is instructive for the problem 
we’re talking about” because pain scientists are looking for neural markers 
of pain in the same way that psychiatric researchers are looking for neural 
markers of psychiatric diseases:43  
 
 
 38. DSM, supra note 37; see also DSM, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm (last visited Mar. 18, 2015). 
 39. See, e.g., Sally L. Satel, Why the Fuss over D.S.M.-5?, Sunday Review, N.Y. TIMES (May 
11, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/12/opinion/sunday/why-the-fuss-over-
the-dsm-5.html?_r=0 (stating that the DSM is an “imperfect guide to predicting” treatments 
because psychiatric diagnoses are based on clinical signs that tend to cluster—not on the 
mechanism of the illness, like with bacterial pneumonia). 
 40. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR DSM-V 33–34 (David J. 
Kupfer et al. eds., 2002) (stating that the current classification in psychiatry resembles medicine of 
50 to 100 years ago, when the pathophysiology of many diseases was not yet known). 
 41. Strategic Research Priorities, Strategy 1.3: Identify and Integrate Biological Markers 
(Biomarkers) and Behavioral Indicators Associated with Mental Disorders, NAT’L INST. MENTAL 
HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/research-priorities/strategic-objectives/strategy-13.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 8, 2015). 
 42. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1; see also Press Release, Thomas R. Insel, Dir., Nat’l Inst. of 
Mental Health, & Jeffrey A. Lieberman, President-elect, Am. Psychological Ass’n, DSM-5 and 
RDoC: Shared Interests (May 13, 2013) (on file with NIMH), available at 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/science-news/2013/dsm-5-and-rdoc-shared-interests.shtml (noting 
that NIMH’s Research Domain Criteria (“RDoC”) project hopes to create new ways of classifying 
mental disorders that directly reflects modern brain science). 
 43. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1. 
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A neural signature of pain would be a diagnostic marker. 
What you’re aiming to do is map a psychological entity—
schizophrenia, depression, pain, whatever—onto a 
physiological entity [as indicated by] a certain pattern of 
BOLD44 response or functional conductivity.45  
. . . 
[Though it is] not trivial to get these things right, there’s 
good reason for optimism that imaging will be useful 
here.46 
 
Professor Farah noted that the challenges of identifying the 
physiological correlates and causes of pain, or of other psychologically 
mediated phenomena like depression, requires careful conceptual work as 
well as intensive “bench” or investigational work.47 To find the 
physiological correlates, “we [first] need to get the psychological 
description right.”48 Professor Farah referred to this process of identifying 
and categorizing the subjective phenomena into natural kinds as “carving 
the bird at the joints.”49 This, she noted, has not yet occurred in psychiatry, 
and “even [the DSM’s] strongest defenders would say it probably isn’t 
really carving the bird of psychopathology at the joints. It’s a sort of good 
enough system that has high reliability, and so much of our knowledge is 
encoded relative to it that we can’t afford to throw it out.”50  
Instead of a physiologically robust description of psychiatric illnesses, 
“we have certain psychological concepts of ability and disability and so 
forth, but we really don’t have a good parse of mental problems into natural 
 
 44. Blood-oxygen level-determination (“BOLD”) technique is a widely used fMRI method 
that measures brain activity by measuring cerebral blood flow. See Nikos K. Logothetis, The 
Neural Basis of the Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Signal, 357 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL 
SCIENCES [PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B] 1003, 1010 (2002) (U.K.) 
 45. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 1–2; see also Logothetis, supra note 44, at 1008, 1010 
(describing the BOLD technique in depth).  
 46.  Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2. 
 47. Id. at 1–2; see also Division of Neuroscience and Basic Behavioral Science (DNBBS), 
NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/organization/dnbbs/index.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (listing, as a high research priority, the development of new 
physiological models to understand biological functions in normal and abnormal mental 
functions). 
 48. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also Division of Neuroscience and Basic Behavioral 
Science (DNBBS), supra note 47. 
 49. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2. 
 50. Id. at 2; see also Press Release, DSM-5 and RDoC: Shared Interests, supra note 42 
(stating that the DSM is still the “contemporary consensus standard” for the diagnosis and 
treatment of mental disorders). 
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kinds.”51 Similarly, she noted, “we don’t have a very good parse of pain 
into the natural kinds of pain.”52 We have clinical and legal categories, such 
as “real pain, malingered pain, chronic pain, subacute [pain], whatever,” but 
these general, descriptive labels may not map onto what happens in the 
brain.53 She suggested that it will be necessary to achieve “an 
intertheoretical reduction,” in which researchers work to harmonize the 
ways they describe and categorize pain with the ways that pain and pain 
disorders are represented in the brain.54 Some of our descriptive labels may 
not map onto the neurophysiological differences of how different kinds of 
pain are experienced and how various pain disorders disturb normal pain 
processing in the brain.55  
This comes back to the idea that “you need to carve the pain bird and 
the brain bird [at its joints],” or achieve a clear understanding of the 
relationship between the phenomenology and the physiology.56 Professor 
Farah noted that there is some relationship between acute and chronic pain, 
but they are sufficiently different in that the “articulation” between them 
might constitute a “joint.”57 Further, there is “evidence that different kinds 
of chronic pain are different physiologically. So, the chronic pain of 
somebody with phantom limb might be different than the chronic pain of a 
bad back or a burn victim . . . .”58 Thus, “carving the bird at the joints” may 
 
 51. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also Thomas A. Widiger & Douglas B. Samuel, 
Diagnostic Categories or Dimensions? A Question for the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders—Fifth Edition, 114 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 494, 494 (2005) (discussing the problems 
with the idea of absolute boundaries in categorical divisions of mental disorders and the 
limitations of this model). 
 52. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2. 
 53. Id. at 2. Cf. C. Maestu Unturbe et al., Pneumatic Device for Somatosensorial and Pain 
Stimulation Compatible with Magnetic Functional Resonance (fMRI) and Magnetoencefalography 
(MEG) DISNESO- 02, XXVI CONGRESO ANUAL DE LA SOCIEDAD ESPAÑOLA DE INGENIERIA 
BIOMÉDICA [CASEIB] 372, 374 (2008) (concluding that there is less variability in descriptions of 
central pain responses because of imaging technology).  
 54. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2. 
 55. Id. Cf. The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 597–99 (explaining the various ways 
researchers have analyzed different pain stimuli that activate different parts of the brain). 
 56. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also A.Vania Apkarian et. al., Pain and the brain: 
Specificity and Plasticity of the Brain in Clinical Chronic Pain, 152 J. PAIN S49, S50 (2011) 
(explaining that the connection between consciousness and biological processes of pain are 
tentative). 
 57. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also Acute vs. Chronic Pain, CLEVELAND CLINIC, 
http://my.clevelandclinic.org/services/anesthesiology/pain-management/diseases-conditions/hic-
acute-vs-chronic-pain (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) (describing the differences between acute pain, 
which is shorter in length and often has an identifiable cause, and chronic pain, which is persistent 
over time and is often incurable and poorly understood). 
 58. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also Apkarian et al., supra note 56, at S55 (discussing how 
distinct pain involves “unique brain regions”); A D (Bud) Craig, Mapping Pain in the Brain, 
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not be as straightforward as finding the distinctions among acute pain, 
chronic pain, emotional pain, and malingered pain. There may be many 
important phenomenological and physiological distinctions that we are only 
beginning to see and understand in the brain. “Again,” she emphasized, “we 
need to sort out these distinctions before we can confidently say I have a 
chronic ‘pain-o-meter.’”59  
Professor Farah then emphasized the importance of the 
phenomenological and neurological differences between different kinds of 
pain.60 She praised the work of Tor Wager, Karen Davis, and others in 
inducing acute pain in the lab and identifying its neurological correlates.61 
She stressed, however, that “we have good clinical, phenomenological and 
some biological reasons to think that chronic and acute pain are pretty 
distinct beasts.”62 If one of these researchers were to “come[] back to us in 
a couple of years and say[] I’ve got this pattern classifier that works 99 
percent of the time [that] say[s] who’s in acute pain and who isn’t . . . . You 
would be thrilled to have that, but you would not want to use it to decide 
whether somebody who’s applied for disability benefits is in chronic 
pain.”63 She then emphasized again that “[y]ou really wouldn’t want to do 
that.”64  
Professor Farah argued that “people go to extremes in evaluating [the 
merits of] functional neuroimaging.”65 Commenters either view the fMRI 
 
WELLCOME TRUST, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/pain/microsite/science2.html (last visited Mar. 
18, 2015) (explaining how different feelings of pain have their own pathways to the brain). 
 59. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3; see also The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 599 (noting, 
despite the developments in the imaging of pain, that the research is still in its early stages and 
requires “further elaboration and replication”). 
 60. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3. 
 61. Id. at 2; see generally Karen D. Davis et al., Functional MRI of Pain- and Attention-
Related Activations in the Human Cingulate Cortex, 77 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 3370 (1997) 
(utilizing fMRIs to determine if regions of the brain were reacting the way they were anticipated 
to react); Tor D. Wager et al., An fMRI-Based Neurologic Signature of Physical Pain, 368 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1388 (2013) (using fMRI to assess pain in particular subjects); Jamil Zaki et al., 
Different Circuits for Different Pain: Patterns of Functional Connectivity Reveal Distinct 
Networks for Processing Pain in Self and Others, 2 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 276 (2007) (exploring 
the overlapping and distinct experiences of pain for self and others). 
 62. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2; see also Acute vs. Chronic Pain, supra note 57 (explaining the 
differences between acute and chronic pain). 
 63. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 2. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 3; see also, e.g., R. Todd Constable, Challenges in fMRI and Its Limitations, in 
FUNCTIONAL MRI: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 75 (Scott H. Faro & Feroze 
B. Mohamed eds., 2006) (addressing the challenges of fMRIs in function); Humera Ahsan et al., 
Application and Advantage of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Blood Oxygen Level 
Dependent (BOLD) Imaging Modality, 59 JOURNAL OF PAKISTAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION [J PAK 
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“as this great panacea that’s going to make psychology obsolete, because 
why do you need all this mind stuff when you can just look at the brain,” or 
they go to the other extreme of dismissing the fMRI as meaningless because 
“they make these beautiful pictures out of these funky [BOLD] signals that 
[vary] depending on what plane you got off of” or other trivial factors that 
can distort the BOLD signal.66 Accordingly, Professor Farah took some 
time “to address some of the technical issues with imaging and with 
identifying these natural kinds at the brain level.”67 
First, she addressed the question of variability in the BOLD signal.68 
She noted that other speakers had given “reasons to be cautious when 
interpreting the results of [BOLD] MRI,” yet she “disagree[d] with . . . the 
implication that this is a fundamental limitation of [BOLD] MRI that will 
keep it from delivering informative results to people . . . who want to . . . 
figure out if somebody is in chronic pain or not.”69 Understanding the 
obstacles that can interfere with the reliability of the BOLD signal does not 
make the BOLD signal useless.70  
These problems show, in Professor Farah’s view, that at least two 
factors need to be addressed to ensure that the research using the fMRI is 
useful.71 The first is that “if you’re going to develop [neuroimaging] 
methods for real world use, [including legal and clinical use, researchers] 
need to standardize them on the relevant populations.”72 This, she said, “is 
totally doable.”73 She acknowledged that “these [experiments] are not easy 
to do or cheap to do, but they are perfectly doable empirical research.”74  
Additionally, she emphasized the use of correct control conditions 
when scanning an individual for research or clinical purposes. If an 
 
MED ASSOC] 794 (2009) (exploring the benefits of using these techniques in diagnosing certain 
types of conditions). 
 66. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3; see also REBECCA A. CLAY, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, 
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING: A NEW RESEARCH TOOL 2 (2007) (“A brain 
scanning technology called functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) isn’t quite a mind 
reader, but it comes close.”); see generally Logothetis, supra note 44, at 1008 (noting that the 
BOLD contrast is the mainstay of fMRIs because of “its reasonably high sensitivity and wide 
accessibility”). 
 67. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. But see also Craig M. Bennett & Michael B. Miller, fMRI reliability: Influences of 
Task and Experimental Design, COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, & BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE (Aug. 10, 
2013) https://labs.psych.ucsb.edu/miller/michael/PDF/Bennett-CABN-2013.pdf (finding that 
many factors impact the reliability of fMRI data). 
 71. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3. 
 72. Id. at 3–4. 
 73. Id. at 3. 
 74. Id. 
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individual who claims to have pain does not produce a BOLD signal 
consistent with the kind of pain he or she claims to have, then it would 
become important to determine if the subject’s brain produces anomalous 
results in response to other forms of stimuli (the control conditions).75 So, 
she opined, “if you don’t get the normal networks showing up in resting 
[BOLD] or for chronic pain . . . and you also don’t get normal responses 
and networks for word reading, color perception, et cetera, then of course 
you’re going to conclude that there’s something misleading about the 
[BOLD] response in this person—not that this person doesn’t have pain.”76 
Professor Farah then turned to two other, common objections to the 
use of fMRI or other forms of neuroimaging for diagnostic or other 
individual uses: the group-to-individual inference problem, and the inverse 
inference problem.77 She acknowledged the concerns about “group-to-
individual [inferences] and worries [that] inverse inferences” are 
“worthwhile rules of thumb.”78 She then continued that she wants to “be 
somewhat provocative in saying an individual is just a group of one. There 
is not . . . [a] categorical difference between inferences to individuals and 
inferences to groups.79 It’s all about the variance and about having the 
appropriate standard sample to relate the individual to.”80  
Professor Farah then discussed the concept of reverse inference as it 
applies to the use of neuroimaging as proof of pain. In this context, she 
noted, reverse inference becomes problematic when the interpreter of an 
fMRI concludes that a particular area of the brain became activated because 
the person was in pain, when in fact any number of other conditions could 
have caused the observed activation.81 Professor Farah provided a helpful 
 
 75. Id.; see also Bennett & Miller, supra note 70 (stating that reliability for controls is higher 
than reliability in clinical disorders). 
 76. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3. 
 77. Id.; see also Benjamin Bumann, The Future of Neuroimaging in Witness Testimony, 12 
AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 873, 874–75 (2012) (discussing the various issues of making a reverse 
inference from groups to individuals in BOLD fMRI responses); Brain Decoding and Inverse 
Inference in fMRI: A Brief Introduction, PARIETAL, 
https://team.inria.fr/parietal/research/fmri_decoding/introduction/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2015) 
(noting problems that researchers see with the inverse inference approach). 
 78. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 3. 
 79. Id. at 4; see also Martha J. Farah et al., Functional MRI-Based Lie Detection: Scientific 
and Societal Challenges, 15 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 123, 126 (2014) (explaining that 
determining the accuracy of fMRI based lie detection on an individual includes assessing the same 
"sensitivity and specificity" of a group of individuals in the general population). 
 80. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 4–5 (discussing this problem in the example of United States v. 
Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 522 (2012)). 
 81. Id. at 5; see also Martha J. Farah, Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater: Critiquing 
Critiques of Functional Neuroimaging, 44 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2014, at S19, S24 
(2014) [hereinafter Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater] (noting that a problem with reverse 
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example: “if pain activates the anterior cingulate cortex (“ACC”), but so 
does cognitive conflict, and so does attention to internal physiological state, 
then just when you see the ACC light up, you can’t know that it was from 
pain when it could have been from other things.”82 In this particular 
scenario, any reverse inference that ACC activation was exclusively due to 
pain would be misleading or mistaken.83  
While Professor Farah acknowledged that reverse inferences like this 
one can be a problem in interpreting neuroimages, she went on to argue that 
“not all reverse inference is pernicious and misleading.”84 Instead, with 
“due diligence” and proper studies that take into account “all the different 
psychological states that somebody could be in,” it becomes possible to 
determine “what the probability is that [the research subject is] in any one 
of the possible states that could have caused [activation]” during the fMRI 
scanning session.85 Accordingly, if the research shows that pain is likely to 
cause a “particular pattern of activation” more so than anything else, then 
one can say (to some degree of certainty) that the individual is in pain.86 
Professor Farah concedes that while “you definitely can’t say 100 percent 
for sure,” it could be possible to “say it’s this likely that the person is in 
pain.”87 The issue then, of course, is the degree of accuracy. The scientific 
and legal communities accept high percentage probabilities as valid in other 
areas of study, as in genetic testing and identification, but Professor Farah 
believes the same can hold true in using neuroimaging as evidence of the 
likelihood of pain.88 
 
inference was discovered in a study of the anterior cingulate cortex (“ACC”), which shows that 
there are multiple psychological states that can cause activation). 
 82. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81 
(“Activity in this area has been elicited by processes as diverse as attention to one’s own heartbeat 
and emotional regulation.”). 
 83. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81 
(noting that the “wanton use of reverse inference” can lead to flaws in the data that is received 
from the fMRI). 
 84. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81 
(stating that reverse inference is not inherently invalid if the interpreters of these studies recognize 
that there is a "range of psychological processes that can activate a region under a given set of 
circumstances"). 
 85. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81 
(noting that although reverse inferences are prone to criticism, it is possible that they can be valid 
if framed correctly). 
 86. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81 
(explaining that a valid reverse inference can be gleaned from the knowledge of a "full range of 
psychological processes" that could produce pain). 
 87. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Brain Images, Babies, and Bathwater, supra note 81 
(hypothesizing that there is a 75 percent chance of high probability with the right evidence). 
 88. See Martha J. Farah, Neuroethics: The Ethical, Legal, and Societal Impact of 
Neuroscience, 63 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 571, 588 (2012) [hereinafter Impact of Neuroscience] 
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Accepting Professor Farah’s assertion that reverse inference as to pain 
and neuroimaging may be a problem in the design of any particular 
experiment or study is not a problem per se, the question then becomes: 
how far are we from being able to use these images in a meaningful way? 
Professor Farah predicts that this potential use of brain imaging is not very 
far away, commenting that she would be surprised if the research had not 
reached this point within ten years.89 While recognizing these studies will 
require no small amount of work, Professor Farah remains optimistic that 
“if what you want is a method that for in certain predetermined populations 
[there can be something that] can give you substantially increased 
confidence that they are in pain or chronic pain . . . it just seems extremely 
obtainable.”90 
Professor Greely built on Professor Farah’s comments by proposing a 
research agenda for how to develop functional neuroimaging to the point 
where it could be admissible in court as evidence of pain. He suggested that 
researchers gather a large cohort of subjects in a particular age range who 
suffer from a common form of chronic pain, “like the most common form 
of chronic lower back pain.”91 These subjects should be control matched 
with a large pain free cohort.92 Scanning and comparing these large 
populations should help researchers to “see if we can come up with . . . 
markers that have . . . substantial positive predictive and negative predictive 
value.”93 For these studies to be rigorous and replicable, Professor Greely 
emphasized the importance of standardized procedures and instructions.94 
 
(comparing genetics and neuroscience as means of predicting probabilities of human behavior); 
see also BRENT GARLAND, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND AND THE SCALES OF 
JUSTICE 5–6 (2004) (explaining that neuroscience has a strong predictive ability that will be useful 
in the courtroom). 
 89. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Martha J. Farah, Emerging Ethical Issues in 
Neuroscience, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1123, 1128 (2002) ("One need not project very far into 
the future to see the increasing role of neuroscience in our lives . . . ."). 
 90. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5; see also Owen D. Jones et al., Law and Neuroscience, 33 J. 
NEUROSCIENCE 17624, 17629 (2013) (noting that neuroscience makes it possible for a person's 
mental state to be determined, which can ultimately be valuable to the legal system). 
 91. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 17. 
 92. Id. at 17; see also Pain Detection, supra note 2, at 444 (referring to a German research 
study in which MRIs were used to compare a group of individuals with chronic low back pain to a 
group of healthy control subjects in order to determine the differences in brain images). 
 93. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 17; see also Impact of Neuroscience, supra note 88, at 576 ("For 
example, if the best prediction from a person's brain activity is to a very high or low value of a 
psychological trait, one could conclude that the person is in fact unlikely to be low or high, 
respectively, on that trait."). 
 94. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 17; see also Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a 
Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental 
States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1154, 1190 (2010) (noting that there is risk of distortion of brain 
images without these standardized procedures). 
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Laboratories that do such research could be independently certified, as with 
laboratories that process DNA.95  
In regards to Professor Greely’s proposal, it might be important to test 
a range of subjects (e.g., not all white college students) under a range of 
conditions.96 Professor Haythornthwaite noted that chronic pain varies 
considerably over time, and suggested that assays of chronic pain would 
need to be repeated multiple times with the same patient since a single scan 
could provide a misleading “snapshot.”97 With these caveats, and with large 
sample sizes, standardization, and certification, Professor Greely stated that 
“there’s a good chance we will get there and should get there.”98 
 
III.      REMARKS OF JUDGE NANCY GERTNER: THE LAW’S NORMATIVE 
AND INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS CANNOT BE “SOLVED” BY SCIENCE 
 
Judge Gertner expressed serious concerns regarding the use of 
neuroimaging as proof of pain in the courtroom. She worried that the 
scientific value of the images may get lost in translation, and doubted the 
courts’ ability to “rationally embod[y] the science in a way that everyone 
can understand.”99 The concerns, she said, are twofold: first, Judge Gertner 
questioned judges’ ability “to be gatekeepers of this science” in light of the 
lax standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence; second, she 
worried that the “potential for distortion” is particularly high when lay 
jurors are asked to interpret complex scientific images.100  
 
 95. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 17; see also STEVE OLSON ET AL., INST. OF MED., INTEGRATING 
LARGE-SCALE GENOMIC INFORMATION INTO CLINICAL PRACTICE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 48 
(2012) (noting that the certification process should include "quality control systems," procedures 
"for repeating unclear or unexpected results," and ensuring that "positive results are not false 
positives"). 
 96. See SALLY SATEL & SCOTT O. LILIENFELD, BRAINWASHED: THE SEDUCTIVE APPEAL OF 
MINDLESS NEUROSCIENCE 195 n.33 (noting that a range of test subjects can differ by "social 
behavior, moral behavior, fairness, performance on IQ tests, and analytical abilities").  
 97. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 21; see also CHRONIC PAIN: ASSESSMENT, DIAGNOSIS, AND 
MANAGEMENT 62 (Michael S. Margoles & Richard Weiner eds., 1999) (indicating that chronic 
pain may change from day to day). 
 98. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 17; see also Brown & Murphy, supra note 94, at 1154, 1207 
(stating that standardization reduces distortion, and large sample sizes are sufficient to show 
normal variance of subjects); OLSON ET AL., supra note 95 (stating that certification of 
laboratories is important for validity in testing). 
 99. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8; see also Judge Nancy Gertner, Commentary on the Need for a 
Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 789–90 (2011) [hereinafter 
Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences] (noting that prosecutors and courts benefit the most 
from forensic evidence because other parties may face the disincentive to challenge that the judge 
abused their discretion by allowing this evidence during a trial). 
 100. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 5–6; see also Adam Teitcher, Comment, Weaving Functional 
Brain Imaging into the Tapestry of Evidence: A Case for Functional Neuroimaging in Federal 
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Judges’ discretionary role in deciding what expert and scientific 
evidence may be admitted could present particular difficulties relative to 
neuroimaging.101 As an initial matter, Judge Gertner noted that the 
threshold for admitting evidence is not very high.102 Under the Federal Rule 
of Evidence 401, a party need only show that the evidence is relevant, or 
that it “makes a fact more likely” in order for that evidence to be 
admitted.103 This low bar to admissibility gives individual judges a great 
deal of discretion as to what will be allowed into the courtroom.104 The 
very same piece of evidence, Judge Gertner suggested, could “come into 
court A and not come into court B,” which is a troubling possibility.105 
Judges’ decisions about what evidence to admit or exclude is “subject to all 
the distortions” that impair decision makers generally, including 
institutional pressures, the decision makers’ own varying knowledge and 
perspectives, and the effects of parties’ resources.106 What “we typically 
see,” Judge Gertner related, is that parties with greater resources are more 
successful in getting their evidence before a judge and getting a favorable 
ruling on the admissibility of that evidence.107 This is not because judges 
favor better resourced parties, but rather because such parties can afford to 
generate more and better quality expert evidence and then present the 
evidence to the court with highly skilled advocates and experts.108  
 
Criminal Courts, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 384, 389 (2011) (explaining Judge Gertner's 
frustration with the admission of scientific evidence because of the question of its reliability).  
 101. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, supra note 
99, at 790 (listing several issues relating to deficiencies in scientific evidence). 
 102. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Teitcher, supra note 100, at 358 n.12 (explaining that 
evidence is relevant when a fact becomes "more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence"). 
 103. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has 
any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and 
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.").  
 104. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Teitcher, supra note 100, at 371 (noting that trial 
judges hear a lot of the facts of the case, giving them a significant amount of discretion in 
admitting evidence). 
 105. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Teitcher, supra note 100, at 369–70 (explaining that 
the evidential inquiry of judges is mostly subjective when determining relevance and reliability). 
 106. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel S. Oberfield, Increasing 
Forensic Evidence's Reliability and Minimizing Wrongful Convictions: Applying Daubert Isn't the 
Only Problem, 43 TULSA L. REV. 285, 286, 291–92, 379 (2007) (noting that there are many 
reasons for distortions in evidence, which can detrimentally impact the legal system). 
 107. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Nancy Gertner, National Academy of Sciences 
Report: A Challenge to the Courts, 27 CRIM. JUST. 8, 11 (2012) ("[U]nequal and limited resources 
make it particularly difficult to raise forensic challenges."). 
 108. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 15; see also REFERENCE MANUAL ON FORENSIC EVIDENCE 19 
(Fed. Judicial Ctr. et al. eds., 3d ed. 2011) (stating that plaintiffs are more likely to choose to pay 
for expensive experts). 
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The process of appellate review does not provide much of a safeguard 
against the inconsistent admission of evidence, as the standard for reversal 
is increasingly difficult to meet.109 Judge Gertner notes that evidentiary 
decisions are reviewed by appellate courts in a way that is “enormously 
deferential[] to the trial judge[s].”110 To get a ruling reversed, a party must 
show that a judge has abused his or her discretion, which requires 
“show[ing] that no conscientious judge acting intelligently could honestly 
have taken the view expressed by the judge.”111 Put more plainly, she said, 
this standard requires the complaining party to demonstrate that the judge 
“act[ed] like a moron” or was “dishonest” in order to win an appellate 
reversal of a trial court’s evidentiary ruling pursuant to the abuse of 
discretion standard.112 When viewed in conjunction with the high degree of 
discretion involved in admitting or denying evidence in the first place, the 
lack of any meaningful review of these rulings is particularly disconcerting.  
Judge Gertner went on to voice another concern that the complex 
science behind neuroimaging can be easily distorted and misinterpreted 
when presented to a lay jury.113 Specifically, Judge Gertner worried about 
the group-to-individual problem introduced by Professor Farah.114 She 
noted that the sophistication of Professor Farah’s numerical explanation is 
“not matched in the courtroom.”115 Instead, juries are often presented with 
simplified, colored brain images that advocates easily can distort.116 Judge 
Gertner explained that “[i]f a bunch of numbers went on a screen, it would 
be easier to understand and say oh it’s just numbers” and data about a 
 
 109. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse 
of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 244–46 (2009) (discussing the standards 
for reversal used by the court, and the difficulties associated with meeting these standards). 
 110. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Jennifer L. Katz, Kelly v. State: Limiting Trial 
Courts’ Broad Discretion to Make Evidentiary Decisions and Managing Trials, 66 MD. L. REV. 
1162, 1170 (2007) (discussing the trial court’s broad discretion pursuant to the rules of evidence, 
limited only by the requirement that decisions are not arbitrary and capricious, or beyond reason).  
 111. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7; see also Peters, supra note 109, at 244–45 (discussing the 
wide meaning of abuse of discretion). 
 112. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7. Cf. Peters, supra note 109, at 245 (discussing the various 
standards applied by courts under “abuse of discretion,” which is not defined by law). 
 113. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 7 (arguing that since the courts’ function as a gatekeeper is 
limited, there is a risk that juries can distort the evidence presented to them). 
 114. Id. at 6; see also id. at 3 (reporting that Prof. Farah highlighted the importance of 
considering group-to-individual problems and the issues concerning inverse inferences). 
 115. Id. at 6; see also id. at 4–5 (discussing issues concerning the use of fMRI data and 
statistical inferences). 
 116. Id. at 6; see also David M. Eagleman, Neuroscience and the Law, 45 HOUS. LAW., 
Mar./Apr. 2008, at 36, 38 (2008), available at 
http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_mar08/indice.htm (noting that jurors could be convinced 
that the pictures are more important than they really are). 
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phenomenon.117 “[B]ut what goes onto the screen is something that looks 
like a brain and [that] is colored,” and so instead of looking like the 
statistical data that it is, it looks like an actual thing—like a photograph or 
an x-ray of the brain, which it is not.118 She noted that even she, with an 
interest in scientific evidence, was initially “astonished to learn that the 
little colors on the [fMRI images] didn’t represent my brain” or any 
particular brain, but instead are statistical re-creations of numerical data 
generated from the averages of many scans of many brains, and that any 
one brain might respond quite differently.119 Her own experience raises the 
question of “[c]an you adequately communicate that to jurors?”120 
Accordingly, this evidence runs the great risk of “being tremendously 
prejudicial precisely because it looks like a brain and has the aura of 
science.”121 
While Judge Gertner finds this science “tremendously interesting,” her 
concerns cause her to want to “press the pause button” on introducing 
evidence consisting of pain neuroimaging in the courtroom.122 In our 
current world, she recommends developing stricter standards that judges 
must adhere to in admitting evidence, in addition to training sessions for 
judges on the relevant science.123 Hoping to avoid inconsistent rulings, 
Judge Gertner urged the legal community to establish “some controls 
 
 117. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also E. Spencer Compton, Note, Not Guilty by Reason of 
Neuroimaging: The Need for Cautionary Jury Instructions for Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal 
Trials, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 333, 345–46 (2010) (discussing how jurors have trouble fully 
grasping neuroimaging data even when provided with expert testimony). But see Joe S. Cecil et 
al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 
727, 757–58 (1991) (discussing how juries struggle to comprehend statistical information). 
 118. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Compton, supra note 117 (noting how jurors have 
trouble fully grasping neuroimaging data even when provided with expert testimony regarding its 
statistical information). But see So Yeon Choe, Comment, Misdiagnosing the Impact of 
Neuroimages in the Courtroom, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1502, 1522 (2014) (discussing a study that 
found that laypeople consider neuroimages as credible because they are viewed as photographs of 
the brain). 
 119. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 14; see also Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging 
Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 422 (2007) 
(describing how fMRI images are developed and used). 
 120. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 14. 
 121. Id. at 6; see also Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: 
Limitations in the Legal Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 
271, 289 (2007) (discussing concerns regarding how people view fMRI images as concrete images 
and as truth); Choe, supra note 118. 
 122. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8. 
 123. Id.; see also Choe, supra note 118, at 1542–44 (discussing the need for training for judges 
and a new standard by which judges should review fMRI evidence). 
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earlier . . . before we start fighting it out in court,” encouraging further 
discourse between judges, legal scholars, clinicians, and neuroscientists.124 
Judge Gertner then raised several issues relating to the normative and 
institutional aspects of legal proceedings. These normative and institutional 
issues prevent neuroimaging and other forms of scientific evidence from 
mapping directly onto legal questions and processes.125 She turned first to 
the normative role of the jury in matters involving the valuation of damages 
for pain and suffering. Jurors considering neuroimaging evidence of pain (if 
admitted) generally would not be making determinations such as “yes or 
no,” but rather questions of how “to quantify pain [and suffering].”126 The 
category of “pain and suffering . . . may sound redundant to the scientists in 
the room,” but, she emphasized, it is not.127 The term “suffering,” she 
explained, is “really a measure of how bad we feel about you [the victim or 
plaintiff], [and] it’s really a lay measure [or] a normative judgment” about 
relative merit.128 Because of the normative aspect of what “suffering” 
means and its value, suffering “does not map onto the science [about pain] 
that we’re talking about.”129 This absence of an identity between what pain 
imaging could show or what pain quantification could measure, and what 
the law means by “suffering” and the values that juries ascribe to “pain and 
suffering” is at the root of “why we’re getting closer but [we] will never 
[get] there . . . .”130 
Judge Gertner then noted that Michael Pardo and Amanda Pustilnik 
had spoken about “social framework evidence,” and that perhaps 
neuroimaging evidence of pain and other subjective states could “come in 
like social framework evidence.”131 With social framework evidence, “you 
 
 124. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 15. 
 125. Id. at 14. 
 126. Id. at 6.  
 127. Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 128–29. 
 128. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Mark A. Geistfield, Due Process and The 
Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 346 (2006) 
(discussing concerns that pain and suffering are a normative judgment for juries). 
 129. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Margaret C. Rodgers, Comment, Subjective Pain 
Testimony in Disability Determination Proceedings: Can Pain Alone be Disabling?, 28 CAL. W. 
L. REV. 173 (1991) (discussing that even though everyone experiences pain, not all suffer the 
same degree of pain). 
 130. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Geistfield, supra note 128, at 339 (discussing the 
various factors that cause juries to have difficulty identifying and quantifying pain and suffering). 
 131. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 14; see also Joel Greenspan, Adam Kolber, & Michael Pardo, 
Imaging the Brain, Changing Minds: Chronic Pain Neuroimaging and the Law Symposium, Panel 
2: “Excess Pain,” Hyperalgisia, and the Variability of Subjective Experience 13 (Apr. 25, 2014) 
[hereinafter Panel 2] (transcript on file with the editors) (discussing the potential of using 
neuroimaging evidence in social science contexts, similar to the use of eyewitness identification 
evidence).  
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make it clear [to the jury that this doesn’t describe any individual, but that 
the evidence represents] averages in the same way that social psychology 
about eyewitness identification comes in.”132 When experts offer evidence 
about the average reliability of eyewitness identification, “[t]hey’re not 
saying, ‘oh, this person’s identification was unreliable,’” but they’re saying 
that issues arise when witnesses make eyewitness identifications.133 Judge 
Gertner expressed the view that “neuroscientific framework” evidence 
could be the best and most plausible use for fMRI or other neuroimaging of 
pain and subjective states, but suggested that jurors still might remain 
confused and unable to distinguish group averages from individual data, 
particularly when faced with colorful pictures that look like real brains.134  
Judge Gertner concluded with some observations about the 
relationship between the skepticism toward pain and the development of 
law in areas related to pain.135 She explained that “one of the reasons why 
[areas of law such as tort] did not pay attention to mental health [complaints 
and] to subjective complaints of pain [is] because of the problem of 
dissembling.”136 In the absence of objective proof in contexts where parties 
stand to gain, the law must be concerned about “the notion that people 
would lie about it.”137 The development of the law, which makes a 
distinction between physical and emotional injuries, “actually followed that 
concern” about fraud relating to claims of conditions that are not 
 
 132. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6, 14; see also Panel 2, supra note 131 (discussing how through a 
social framework, a shift can occur regarding how neuroimaging evidence can be used); see also 
Mark S. Boudin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a Skeptic, 73 
U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 911 (2005) (noting court findings that eyewitness evidence is similar to the 
knowledge of behavioral scientists, such as psychologists).  
 133. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 14; see also Boudin, supra note 132 (stating that experts provide 
testimony regarding the average eyewitness’s reliability).   
 134. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 6; see also Teitcher, supra note 100, at 373 (explaining the 
“Christmas Tree Effect”). Professor Adam Kolber commented on Judge Gertner’s concerns, 
remarking that over a decade ago, judges and scholars initially raised the same concerns relative to 
the admission of CAT and structural MRI scans in cases involving closed head trauma. Panel 4, 
supra note 1, at 13. The concern at that time was that the lights and colors would confuse and 
dazzle the jurors, a phenomenon commonly called “the Christmas Tree Effect.” Id. Yet, it is now 
common to admit CT and structural MRIs in closed head trauma cases; it seems, Professor Kolber 
remarked, that the Christmas Tree Effect has not prevented jurors from intelligently considering 
such evidence in other kinds of brain related cases. Id. at 13–14. 
 135. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 16. Judge Gertner offered these comments during the question 
and answer period of the panel. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.; see also Steven I. Friedland, Law, Science and Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 
339 (1998) (discussing the concerns the court faces regarding malingering). 
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objectively verifiable.138 She suggested that the law might begin to break 
down the distinction between physical and mental, and objective and 
subjective.139 She re emphasized her earlier point, however, that clinical 
and research measures of brain states and other physiological states will 
“never map 100 percent onto [legal concepts of] pain and suffering and the 
quantitative measures of [the value of] pain.”140 
IV.      REMARKS OF PROFESSOR STACEY TOVINO: NEUROIMAGING OF 
PAIN HAS CONCRETE LEGAL POTENTIAL BUT COULD REINSCRIBE 
EXISTING INEQUALITIES 
 
Professor Tovino discussed three areas of law that she believes could 
be affected by advances in the neuroscientific understanding of pain, and by 
pain imaging in particular.141 She discussed the Social Security Disability 
Insurance (“SSDI”) regime, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
and various state law regimes relating to the abuse of children, the elderly, 
and other vulnerable populations.142 She concluded by sounding a note of 
caution drawn from her years in practice about the over zealous adoption of 
new sciences by the plaintiffs’ bar, particularly in areas relating to 
neuroscience and neuroimaging.143 
SSDI is one area of the law that Professor Tovino believes will be 
greatly affected if neuroimaging can be introduced as proof of pain.144 
SSDI statutes, she noted, practically “beg for images” because “both the 
SSDI statute and regulations say that an individual statement as to pain 
‘shall not alone be conclusive evidence of disability.’”145 Instead, the 
 
 138. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 16; see also Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN. L. 
REV. 809, 818 (2015) (describing tort law’s distinction between physical and emotional harm for 
“fear of fraudulent claims due to the subjective and unprovable nature of emotional injury”). 
 139. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 16. 
 140. Id. (responding to a question as to whether the fMRI can provide an objective measure of 
pain when considering race and gender discrimination); see also The Experiential Future, supra 
note 2, at 600–04 (outlining five major obstacles to neuroimaging pain assessment techniques 
including: generalizing pain degrees across groups, inability to measure individual variations, the 
unknown effects of chronic pain, the sensory versus cognitive components of pain, and the 
inability to measure malingered pain). 
 141. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8–12. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 12 (describing her personal experiences of defending hospice workers who did not 
know their patients were in pain). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 10; see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2012); How We Evaluate Symptoms, 
Including Pain, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 (2014). Interestingly, other professional organizations, like 
the American Pain Society, do not require additional proof of pain, stating “that the patient’s self 
report of pain is the single most reliable indicator of pain.” See AM. PAIN SOC’Y, PAIN: CURRENT 
UNDERSTANDING OF ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND TREATMENTS 4 (2012). 
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statutes and regulations call for claimants to “prove that there is physical or 
mental impairment resulting from an anatomical, physiological, or 
psychological abnormality that can be shown by medically acceptable 
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”146 Claimants and 
adjudicators emphasize the word “shown” in the regulations, creating a bias 
in favor of image based forms of medical evidence, like an x-ray or an 
fMRI.147 She went on to explain that it is “because of [the] language that 
we have in our federal statutes and regulations that I know individuals will 
almost be compelled to try to introduce neuroimaging evidence of their 
pain” if it is available.148  
The SSDI regulations further state that pain “shall not alone be 
conclusive evidence of [a] disability.”149 What is “so interesting” about this 
is that the requirements of the regulation are “almost exactly the opposite” 
of the definitions of pain and proof of pain that are embraced by medical 
organizations.150 For example, she noted that “the American Pain Society 
states that the patient’s self report of pain is the single most reliable 
indicator of pain.”151 
Health insurance is another realm that would potentially be affected by 
the neuroimaging of pain.152 As an expert in mental health parity law,153 
Professor Tovino was particularly concerned with the coverage (or lack 
thereof) of mental health issues under government insurance plans.154 As 
health insurance laws currently stand, there is no “federal definition of 
mental health and substance use disorder benefits that would be given equal 
 
 146. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. 
 147. See Mickles v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 928–29 (4th Cir. 1994) (sustaining an ALJ denial of 
benefits because after four doctors and extensive testing—including a CAT scan, ultrasound 
examinations, an electromyogram, a nerve conduction study, upper gastrointestinal studies, 
serological tests, and bone tests—they could not find the alleged pain).  
 148. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10. 
 149. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. 
 150. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; see also AM. PAIN SOC’Y, supra note 145 (defining pain as a 
purely subjective analysis with no objective measures). 
 151. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; AM. PAIN SOC’Y, supra note 145. 
 152. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; see generally Tovino, supra note 119, at 469–78 (analyzing 
the effects of neuroimaging examinations on health insurance coverage and payouts). 
 153. Tovino, supra note 119. 
 154. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10. According to Professor Tovino, mental health parity law 
“essentially tries to get rid of the distinctions [between] physical health conditions and mental 
health conditions in the context of health insurance.” Id. at 12; see also Stacey A. Tovino, 
Reforming State Mental Health Parity Law, HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 456 (2011) 
(analyzing divergent state parity laws and justifying expanding state parity laws by eliminating 
“biologically-based” and “severe mental illness” artificial distinctions, and proposing a model 
uniform mental health parity law).  
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protection.”155 Instead, each state must “designate or pick something called 
an ‘essential health benefits benchmark plan.’”156 Until at least 2015, states 
must offer benefits for any mental health issue covered under their plan, but 
are not required to do so for any mental health issue not listed in the 
plan.157 This, she noted, has far reaching effects for American citizens with 
mental health issues, and Professor Tovino explained how this has played 
out in the health care system:158 
 
some states’ benchmark plans still contain exclusion for 
pain management services to the extent they’re not offered 
through hospice, which means that we still have, even post 
Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, post the Paul Wellstone 
and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addition 
Equity Act of 2008, and post Affordable Care Act of 2010, 
we still have discrimination against individuals with mental 
health conditions, especially chronic and acute pain in the 
context of health insurance.159 
 
If patients were able to provide neuroimaging as proof of their chronic 
or acute pain, then the discrimination that exists in relation to health 
insurance coverage of mental health conditions could potentially be reduced 
or eliminated.160 More generally, Professor Tovino’s observation about the 
lack of parity coverage for pain management of conditions that fall under 
 
 155. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; see also Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created 
Equal: Reforming Federal Mental Health Insurance Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 7–9 (2012) 
(describing how most public health care beneficiaries and some individuals with private insurance 
do not have a federal legal right to equal physical and mental health insurance benefits); cf. B. 
Jessie Hill, What is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional Implications of Defining “Medical 
Necessity” and “Essential Health Benefits” Under the Affordable Care Act, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 
445, 449–50 (2012) (analyzing the “circularity” in defining the terms “medical necessity” and 
“essential health benefits” due to statutes leaving other entities, such as states or insurers, to create 
the definitions). 
 156. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; see Hill, supra note 155, at 446 (describing how the 
Affordable Care Act grants states the authority to define the term “essential health benefits” and to 
choose a package of essential benefits to be provided). 
 157. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; Tovino, supra note 155, at 42–44. 
 158. Tovino, supra note 155, at 12; see infra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
 159. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 12; see also Tovino, supra note 155, at 43–44 (distinguishing 
between grandfathered and non-grandfathered insurance plans and detailing how many health 
plans are exempt from providing mental health and substance use disorder benefits). 
 160. Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON 
L. REV. 469, 495–97 (2009) (concluding that neuroimaging can improve the passage and non-
discriminatory application of mental health parity laws, and can be used as evidence to 
demonstrate that mental health disorders are biological in nature, which means that the distinction 
between physical and mental illness is artificial). 
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the rubric of mental health diagnoses shows just how the classification 
(whether legal, medical, or administrative) of chronic pain conditions as 
“psychiatric” rather than the straightforward “medical” classification leads 
to discriminatory limitations on denials of care.161 This points to the crucial 
issue of clarifying, for legal and medical actors, the relationship between 
pain and negative emotion and establishing that the presence of negative 
emotion in the pain experience should not be an excluding condition for the 
provision of pain management services.162 
The neuroimaging of pain could also possibly impact abuse and 
neglect laws.163 Professor Tovino noted that various branches of law “have 
always struggled” with questions related to the kinds of pain inflicted by 
child abuse and elder abuse (or the abuse of other vulnerable populations, 
like persons living in care facilities).164 She noted that many forms of abuse 
do not involve direct physical battery like being “kicked or punched, but 
what has happened to them causes them a lot of physical pain and suffering 
[and] also emotional pain and suffering.”165 Most of the pertinent statutes 
and regulations “do define physical abuse to include physical pain, and then 
they also define emotional abuse to include emotional pain”; but plaintiffs 
have typically been unable to definitively prove any long lasting physical or 
emotional pain experienced as a result of abuse or neglect.166 The 
neuroimaging of pain, she suggested, could shed light on the long lasting 
 
 161. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 12 (describing how neuroimaging studies led to the 
reclassification of gambling from an impulse disorder to something more akin to a substance 
abuse disorder, which qualified gambling addicts for mental health services under the Affordable 
Care Act); see generally Tovino, supra note 155 (analyzing the effects of distinguishing between 
physical and mental illness, and the resulting discrimination against mental health coverage). 
 162. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 12; see also Goldberg, supra note 138, at 826 (discussing the 
difficulties of measuring “emotional harm” and “psychic injuries,” and recent advances in 
identifying changes in neural pathways of patients suffering from PTSD). 
 163. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 11. 
 164. Id. at 12; see also The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 624–26 (describing how 
neuroimaging can supplement evidence in physical or sexual abuse cases if the victim is either 
unable to communicate or may be considered unreliable). 
 165. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 12; see generally Debra Niehoff, Invisible Scars: The 
Neurobiological Consequences of Child Abuse, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 847, 861 (2007) (detailing, 
through the use of neuroimaging, the extensive, long term trauma associated with child 
maltreatment, abuse, and neglect).  
 166. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 12; see also 42 U.S.C. § 5119c (2012) ([C]hild abuse crime [is] . 
. . a crime committed under any law of a State that involves the physical or mental injury, sexual 
abuse or exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child by any person . . . .”); 45 
C.F.R. § 1340.2 (2014) (defining “child abuse and neglect” as “the physical or mental injury, 
sexual abuse or exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a child . . . .”); The 
Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 624 (describing how of the three million cases referred to 
child protective services, child sexual abuse can rarely be diagnosed because physical findings are 
often absent).  
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effects of indirect physical and emotional pain, and, in particular, on the 
formative effects of early life physical and emotional pain.167 The use of 
neuroimaging in this capacity could have far reaching effects on this area of 
the law.168  
Professor Tovino noted that new understandings of chronic pain 
diseases may be informing anti-discrimination laws under the ADA.169 
Until 2008, a person who suffered from a chronic pain condition could not 
be considered disabled under the Act if the person’s pain responded to 
treatment—that is, if the person could take medication that reduced his 
daily pain to a tolerable level, then he would not qualify as disabled for 
ADA purposes.170  
This created a distinction under the ADA regime between pain 
conditions and other medical conditions whose impairments can be 
mitigated.171 If a person is deaf, for example, but can hear using a 
prosthetic device like a cochlear implant, he continues to be a deaf 
individual with a qualifying disability, entitling him to protection under the 
ADA.172 The use of a prosthetic that reduces the impairment caused by the 
disability still means that the person is qualified as “disabled” for purposes 
of the Act.173 In 2008, the ADA Amendments Act removed this distinction, 
acknowledging that even if treatment improves the degree of impairment 
 
 167. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 11; see also Ruth Eckstein Grunau, Neonatal Pain in Very 
Preterm Infants: Long-Term Effects on Brain, Neurodevelopment and Pain Reactivity, 4 RAMBAM 
MAIMONIDES MEDICAL JOURNAL [RAMBAM MAIMONIDES MED J] 1, 3 (2013) (Isr.) (explaining 
the use of MRIs to track brain development following neonatal pain). 
 168. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 11; see also Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the 
Law: Trends and Directions for Future Scholarship, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 44, 46, 52 (2007) 
[hereinafter Functional Neuroimaging and the Law] (explaining the potential implications for 
understanding pain in the context of tort and criminal law). 
 169. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 11; see also Functional Neuroimaging and the Law, supra note 
168, at 48 (noting the potential of neuroimaging to identify a disability, and enabling employers to 
screen individuals based on the information). 
 170. Tovino, supra note 155, at 11; see also 42 U.S.C. §12102(2) (1990) (defining “disability” 
as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities 
of an individual, a record of such impairment, or being regarded as having such an impairment); 
see also 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(E) (2009) (“[T]he determination of whether an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of 
mitigating measures.”).  
 171. Tovino, supra note 155, at 11; compare 42 U.S.C. §12102(2) (1990) (making no mention 
of potential pain mitigation) with 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(E) (2009) (stating that making a 
determination as to whether an impairment limits a life activity or not will be done without 
looking to any mitigating circumstances or measures). 
 172. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I) (2009) (listing hearing aids and cochlear implants as 
examples of mitigating measures that are not regarded in the determination of impairment). But 
see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii) (2009) (“[T]he mitigating measures of ordinary eyeglasses or 
contact lenses shall be considered . . . .”).  
 173. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I) (2009). 
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imposed by a chronic pain condition, the individual continues to suffer from 
an ongoing medical condition that may be disabling.174 This formal parity 
may implicitly recognize a medical advance that the scientists in this 
conference have described: pain is both a symptom and a disease in itself—
the presence or absence of the symptom of pain on a given day does not 
indicate whether the person suffers from an ongoing chronic pain 
disorder.175 Thus, a person with a chronic pain condition may have a 
symptom free day without being cured of the disease with its complex and 
multi faceted etiology.176 
Professor Tovino then offered with some words of caution, grounded 
in her role as a civil and regulatory attorney. She described seeing how 
quickly new technology involving brain imaging can pervade areas of 
law.177 She voiced particular concern with overeager plaintiffs adopting 
developing science, warning:  
 
whenever we have an advance in the neuroscientific 
understanding of a particular health condition or an 
advance in neuroimaging, you just have literally no idea 
how quickly plaintiffs, patients, individuals, claimants, 
whatever you want to call them, will jump on that 
bandwagon and try to use it to achieve whatever goal they 
may have.178 
 
Professor Tovino voiced some concerns regarding the use of 
neuroimaging as proof of pain.179 Drawing on her work as a medical 
historian, she grounded her cautions with important lessons from history.180 
She discussed the historically inequitable treatment of pain across various 
social strata, “including class, race, age, gender, occupation, and other 
 
 174. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (2009) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a 
disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”). 
 175. See The Experiential Future, supra note 2, at 597 (noting the problems inherent in 
intersubjective evaluations of pain, and explaining how scientific advances can help alleviate 
them). 
 176. See id. at 600 (listing pain’s complex nature as one of five obstacles facing new pain 
evaluating technology). 
 177. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10; see also Jay D. Aronson, The Law’s Use of Brain Evidence, 6 
ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 93, 94 (2010) (noting the potential dangers of applying new technology 
to the law). 
 178. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 10. 
 179. Id. at 8. 
 180. Id. 
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indicia of social status and hierarchy.”181 She then urged the members of 
the conference to be mindful of persistent inequities in the practice of 
medicine and the provision of adequate pain relief to women and minorities 
in particular.182 
One particularly troubling example in the history of medicine involves 
the administration of anesthesia, which historically was governed by a 
“complex moral calculus.”183 Physicians historically were less likely to 
dispense pain medication to “individuals of lower class, including racial and 
ethnic minorities.”184 Similarly, in a legal forum, the pain complaints of 
blue collar citizens were often rejected.185 After railway accidents in both 
the United States and Great Britain, “many physicians rejected injured 
laborers and railway and other common carrier passengers’ complaints of 
pain.”186 Put simply, Professor Tovino opined, the pain of the privileged 
mattered while the pain of the poor did not.187 
In discussing the long history of inequitable pain treatment, Professor 
Tovino went on to note the “very poor history of experimenting on racial 
and ethnic minorities, and inflicting pain on them in human subjects 
research.”188 Invasive studies typically were not conducted on subjects 
from “racial and ethnic majorities, including Caucasian Americans.”189 
Professor Tovino discussed the disturbing case of Dr. J. Marion Sims, a 
physician who “conducted experimental surgical interventions for 
vesicovaginal fistulas on populations of African American slave women, 
 
 181. Id.; see generally Dania Palanker, Note, Enslaved by Pain: How the U.S. Public Health 
System Adds to Disparities in Pain Treatment for African Americans, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL’Y 847 (2008) (tracing the disparate pain treatment of African Americans in the United 
States from slavery to the present). 
 182. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8.  
 183. Id.; see also Daniel Goldberg, Pain Without Lesion: Debate Among American 
Neurologists, 1850–1900, 15 INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES IN THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY 
[19] 1, 11 (2012) (U.K.). 
 184. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 856 (describing the 
painful experiments performed on slaves without pain medication or sedation). 
 185. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8; see also Goldberg, supra note 183 (explaining how pain 
treatment in the nineteenth century was distributed according to social strata). 
 186. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8; see also Goldberg, supra note 183 (“In both Great Britain and 
the USA, many physicians and neurologists rejected injured workers and railway passengers’ 
complaints of injury following railway accidents.”). 
 187. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9. 
 188. Id.; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 855–56 (explaining the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Experiment and the resulting mistrust of the American healthcare system by African Americans). 
 189. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9. 
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but not Caucasian women, due to his belief that slaves had much lower 
sensitivity to pain than his white patients.”190 
These examples remain relevant as concerns relating to the 
“inequitable under-treatment” of pain along class and racial lines continue 
to pervade health care today.191 In 2011, Professor Tovino noted, the 
Institute of Medicine declared that the “inequitable treatment of pain is so 
significant that it is a public health problem.”192 This problem is 
particularly prevalent in emergency rooms since there are few, if any, 
objective tests to determine if someone is in pain.193 The administration of 
pain medicine or other pain management techniques is a highly subjective 
action left to doctors’ discretion.194 These discretionary determinations may 
incorporate the biases prevalent in the culture where the physician lives and 
practices; thus, “multiple current studies show that physicians have 
unconscious racial and ethnic biases when deciding whether or not” to 
prescribe pain medicine.195 To prevent history from repeating itself as the 
science of pain imaging progresses, Professor Tovino emphasized that it is 
important to acknowledge and learn from these examples of the inequitable 
treatment of pain.196 
 
 
 190. Id.; see also Goldberg, supra note 183, at 23 n.40 (“[P]art of the reason J. Marion Sims 
conducted his experiments regarding a surgical intervention for vesicovaginal fistula on African 
American slave women was due to his belief that the slaves had much lower sensitivity to pain 
than his white patients.”). 
 191. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 856 (noting that although 
the most blatant segregation ended with the Civil Rights Act and the creation of Medicare, 
remnants continue today). 
 192. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9; INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REPORT BRIEF: 
RELIEVING PAIN IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FROM TRANSFORMING PREVENTION, CARE, 
EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Relieving-Pain-in-America-A-
Blueprint-for-Transforming-Prevention-Care-Education-
Research/Pain%20Research%202011%20Report%20Brief.pdf.  
 193. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 851–52 (describing a 
1996 study of emergency room prescribing practices, finding that African Americans received 
fewer analgesics). 
 194. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 866–67 (noting that 
physician bias can affect treatment decisions and communication with a patient). 
 195. Panel 4, supra note 1, at 9; see also Palanker, supra note 181, at 866–67 (citing an 
American Medical Association report finding that physicians harbor racial stereotypes that affect 
treatment decisions). 
 196. See Panel 4, supra note 1, at 8.  
